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Public Sector Pension Plans
Lessons and Challenges for
the Twenty-First Century.
Edwin C. Hustead and Olivia S. Mitchell
Pension systems for government employees represent an important and
influential segment of the pension market. In the United States, for ex-
ample, pension plans for state and local employees include almost 13 million
workers (Mitchell et aI., this volume). Military retirement programs cover
an additional 3 million personnel, and the federal government has several
of its own plans adding almost another 3 million covered employees to the
public pension fold (Hustead and Hustead, this volume). Public pensions
are also widespread in Canada (Pozzebon, this volume). Not only are the
numbers of included employees impressive: the financial clout wielded by
these plans is also enormous. In the United States, state and local employee
pensions controlled over $2.4 trillion in assets in 1998, while federal and
military pension assets stood at almost $700 million.
With so many participants and so much money at stake, it is only reason-
able that these financial institutions have come under scrutiny of late. How
are public pension plans structured, in terms of their benefit promises and
financing? How is the public pension asset pool invested, and what issues
are influential in designing the investment practices and resulting returns?
What risks do participants bear, in these plans, and which risks are explicitly
or implicitly passed on to other stakeholders including taxpayers, when pen-
sion promises are made? In this volume we provide answers to these ques-
tions by offering an overview of the benefits, financing, governance struc-
ture, and challenges facing a wide range of public plans in North America.
The analysts writing herein speak to public plan benefits specialists, as well
as policymakers, pension plan participants, and taxpayers, and those from
the private sector interested in lessons from the public plan arena. While our
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focus is mainly on the United States and Canada, the findings here should
also be of keen interest to those in other countries, as well.
Several different types of plans are examined here, including pensions for
employees of state governments, local governments, teachers, uniformed
officers (police and firefighters), the armed forces, and federal civil servants.
The analysis in each case focuses first on the structure of the plans them-
selves, and next asks how good ajob are they doing for the stakeholders in-
volved. The stakeholders in public plans include participants and taxpayers,
who must in turn ask how well these plans are funded, how they are gov-
erned, and how pension assets are performing. We also discuss possible
arenas in which the form and structure of the public plan environment could
be improved, including changes in the regulatory and tax environment in
which they operate. Because private sector pensions operate under a some-
what different legal setting from public plans, we seek to draw lessons for
private pensions from the public experience, and vice versa. Finally, we iden-
tify several challenges for the future that confront public sector pension
plans. Some of these are also relevant to the workforce as a whole, involving
the fact of population and workforce aging, while others are more specific
to public plans, pertaining to the special governance issues that arise when
plan sponsors are operating in the interests of both plan participants and
taxpayers. We conclude with an analysis of several interesting case studies,
ranging from the special circumstances of the District of Columbia to the
issues linking pension and state budgets as in New Jersey and Florida, and
governance as practiced in Pennsylvania.
The Structure and Function of Public Pension Systems
Most public sector pensions in North America are of the defined benefit
variety, as indicated by Mitchell et al. (this volume) who focus on state and
local plans, by Hustead and Hustead (this volume) who examine military
and civil servant plans, and by Pozzebon (this volume) who reviews the state
of Canadian public employee pensions. Beyond this broad generalization,
there is tremendous diversity, since different types of pension systems cover
state and local governmental employees, federal workers, and members of
the military. Further the plans differ, one from the other, in terms of their
benefits, their contributions and financing arrangements, and their gover-
nance structure. For example, in the United States, about three-quarters of
all state and local employees are included in the national social security sys-
tem, implying that here the public employee pension may playa relatively
smaller role in meeting retirement income needs, as compared to plans that
have opted out of social security. Similarly, 40 percent of federal employ-
ees are currently not included in social security, though all federal employ-
ees hired after 1983 and all military personnel have been included in the
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national social security program. In the future, social security will probably
be extended to cover all governmental employees, since virtually all plans
to reform the u.s. social security system require coverage for all state and
local employees, as is currently the case for private sector employees.
In the United States, public pension plans are often seen as paying rather
generous benefits to retirees, particularly compared to those provided to
their private sector counterparts. One way to judge this contention is to
compare benefit formulas, where a "benefit multiplier" is applied to years of
service times preretirement pay. Private sector retirement plans tend to pro-
vide a multiplier ofless than 1.75 percent of pay, and use the retiree's final
five-year average salary. By contrast, the majority of state and local plans
that use this approach employ a multiplier of 1.75 percent or higher; the
federal Civil Service Retirement System (CSRS) also uses a multiplier that
averages over 1.75 percent. In addition, CSRS and over 60 percent of state
and local plans base benefits on the highest three-year average pay. The rela-
tive advantage of governmental plans compared to private sector plans in-
creases after retirement, inasmuch as many state and local plans, as well as
the CSRS, index benefits to inflation. By contrast, few private sector plans
have automatic indexing and some never increase benefits after retirement.
Most private sector plans rely instead on ad hoc inflation adjustments, which
typically make up for less than half of inflation.
On the other hand, these more generous public plan benefits are often
"paid for" by higher employee contributions than is typically found among
private sector employees. As we show below, public employee contributions
average 5 percent of pay, with higher rates (6-7 percent) for plans covering
teachers, police, and firefighters. By contrast, in the private sector, it is un-
common for participants to payout ofworkers' pay, as is true in the military
retirement systems. It must be recognized, of course, that the cost of retire-
ment benefits is related to more than simply benefit levels and employee
contributions. Investment performance also plays a role in influencing the
cost per dollar of benefit. For example, the CSRS employer contribution per
dollar of benefits is higher than that of most other plans because CSRS is in-
vested in U.S. Treasury-backed securities expected to earn 7 percent a year.
By contrast, in recent years, many state and local plans adopted investment
policies similar to those of private sector pensions, with heavy weighting in
equities. This change in investment policy, coupled with a strong stock mar-
ket, has resulted in lower employer contributions.
An important new development that we highlight in this volume is that
some government employers have begun to move gradually to a defined
contribution approach, while others have adopted a hybrid approach. This
development is being adopted by public sector employers to better meet
the demographics of tomorrow's workforce, according to Eitelberg (this vol-
ume) and Fore (this volume). One of the first defined contribution plans in
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North America for public employees was the U.S. Federal Employees Re-
tirement System (FERS), a plan that covers federal employees hired after
1983. As is the case in many private sector pensions, FERS combines both a
defined benefit and a defined contribution plan. Under this plan, the com-
bined income from both plans plus social security is about the same as was
payable under the precursor plan, CSRS, but the mix of benefits is much
different. Short-service employees at young ages will do much better under
the new plan, FERS, than they would have under the old plan, CSRS. But
full-career employees retiring with unreduced benefits will do much better
under CSRS than under FERS. In this way, the new model of public pension
plans is seen by employers, and often by employees, as better adapted to the
mobile, investment-oriented workforce ofthe twenty-first century.
Public Pension Plan Finances
Pension plans represent long-term contracts between employers and the
plan participants, who give up current salary either directly through salary
reduction or indirectly through foregone earnings. This is done in exchange
for future retirement benefits payable by the pension plan. In the case of
a defined benefit plan, the retirement promise is financed by contributions
and returns on invested assets. Figuring out how much must be contrib-
uted, and how the assets should be invested, constitutes a major task of
the public pension plan managers. In general, contributions must be deter-
mined based on plan obligations, which are in turn determined by actuaries
who conduct valuations of the plan. Assumptions playa key role, including
anticipated age, service, and compensation of the plan's membership with
demographic assumptions related to mortality, disability, and probabilities
of retirement, and with economic assumptions regarding wage increases,
inflation, and projected rates of return on plan investments (Hustead, this
volume). The resulting valuation gives employers a measure of the plan's
long-term liabilities and the contributions required to finance the long-term
liabilities in an orderly and systematic manner through time (Mitchell et aI.,
this volume).
In practice, of course, public plans differ from one another in terms of
the underlying assumptions they use, and actuaries also can select among
a range of methods to determine the pension plan's liabilities. In addition,
alternative methods may be employed to determine the value of plan as-
sets available to fund the promised pension benefits; it is not uncommon
for assets in public plans to be reported in such a way as to reduce the vola-
tility of year-to-year market fluctuations. For all these reasons, the status
of public plans is not always transparent or comparable across systems. De-
spite these caveats, it appears that in the United States at least, state and
local plans hold pension assets equal to 88 percent of liabilities, with some-
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what higher funding ratios among state and local employee plans (90 and 97
percent, respectively) as compared to systems covering teachers and public
safety employees (82 and 88 percent respectively; Mitchell et aI., this vol-
ume). This is an improvement in the funding ratios of most plans over the
last generation. The strong performance of the stock market has contrib-
uted to the improvement in funding status, to some extent as a result of
increasing equity investment. The "flow" funding ratio of 98 percent indi-
cates that state and local employers have typically met their new pension
obligations as they arise. By contrast, the federal government pension plans
prove to be much less well funded. In particular, the CSRS fund is not fully
financed and the military benefits are funded over a much longer period
than common for state government plans. The combined unfunded liability
of the military and civilian systems is estimated at over $1 trillion.
One reason that state and local pension systems can boast such a strong
funding stance today is that many of these plans invested heavily in stocks
during the 1980s and 1990s. This would not have happened given invest-
ment restrictions and practices in place during the 1960s: indeed, for years,
many public plans were prohibited from investing in anything but govern-
ment bonds. The practice of requiring public sector plans to either invest in,
or avoid, certain types of holdings is a very old one, as illustrated by Clark
et al. (this volume) in their analysis of the Navy pension plan. But, as Mun-
nell and Sunden (this volume) show, state and local systems have been al-
lowed to gradually move increasing fractions of their assets into stocks in
the last four decades. Today public pensions hold only slightly less equity
(59 percent) than do private pension funds (64 percent) with the balance
made up of more bonds (35 percent versus 29 percent). u.s. state and local
plans also have some international equity exposure (11 percent) though less
than that of private funds (14 percent).
Holding stock has benefited many governmental plans, but some restric-
tions remain for public pension plan managers. For example, Canadian pub-
lic plans are still restricted from holding any more than 20 percent of as-
sets in non-Canadian assets (Pozzebon, this volume). And in some cases,
U.S. public sector pensions still face restrictions in terms of maximum ceil-
ings that can be held in certain forms (e.g., venture capital). Whether it is
a good idea for public pension stakeholders to have massive amounts of
equity in the pension portfolio is also a matter ofextensive and ongoing de-
bate. Peskin (this volume) argues that public plans' assets should be chosen
to match liability streams more precisely, rather than simply be invested in
equities to the extent they are. A contrary view is taken by Munnell and Sun-
den (this volume), who argue that public pension stakeholders are better
served by taking advantage of the equity premium. While this debate is not
resolved here, the lines are clearly drawn and the choices illuminated.
Having recognized that the investment mix is rather similar between
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public and private pension systems, it is logical that public plan investment
returns should also track private plan returns. Of course, returns are also
influenced by investment and other expenses that must also be taken into
account injudging investment performance. In the public plans under study
here, we find that per member costs averaged $211 per member per year
across all plans but were only one-third that level in a dollar-weighted com-
putation. This suggests that larger plans incur substantially lower expense
on an annual basis (Mitchell et aI., this volume). Investment expenses com-
puted as a fraction of system assets totaled 44 basis points but were only
27 basis points for the dollar-weighted total. Fees in this range are consis-
tent with the lower end of institutional money management fees charged by
pension investment managers.
Governance and RegUlation of Public Pension Plans
Governmental pension systems are generally managed by a board, with
the group size and composition varying widely but averaging around eight
members. We find that the majority of the members is appointed by poli-
ticians or serves ex officio; sometimes board members may be elected by
plan participants. In general, these pension boards are directly charged with
pension investment decisions (88 percent), most are directly responsible
for benefits (71 percent), and most (84 percent) bear responsibility for as-
set allocation and actuarial assumptions needed to determine plan funding
and contribution obligations (Mitchell et aI., this volume). An interesting
insight into how a specific board works appears in Brosius's (this volume)
evaluation of the board structure, duties and responsibilities for the Penn-
sylvania State Employees Retirement System. A different perspective on gov-
ernance structure, of the federal retirement systems including the Federal
Thrift Retirement Investment Board, is examined by Hustead and Hustead
(this volume).
Federal regulation ofgovernmental retirement plans has important simi-
larities with the private sector but also many differences. Crane (this vol-
ume) highlights key differences including exemption from financial over-
sight by the Internal Revenue Service and from insurance charges (and
coverage) by the Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation. Useem and Hess
(this volume) link board structure with public plan investment policy. They
find that retirement systems differ greatly in terms of their use of in-house
versus external money managers, the extent to which boards oversee in-
vestment strategy, and the resultant investment performance of public plan
assets.
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Looking Ahead
Look.ing across the many different public sector pension systems that have
flourished in North America over the last few decades, several messages be-
come clear. Although there are many types of benefit formulas, the main
model for public sector pension provision has been the defined benefit plan.
However, the status quo is changing in the face ofworkforce and other pres-
sures. By comparison, private sector pensions have been subject to simi-
lar workplace pressures for a generation, and many private employers have
already made the transition to hybrid or defined contribution plans, well
ahead of the public sector developments.
Public pension plan benefit offerings have also been seen as relatively
generous in the past, as compared to private pensions, but some of this ap-
parent generosity is attributable to the fact that governmental participants
were often not covered by social security in the past. If social security cov-
erage were to be mandated for the remainder of public sector employees,
it is likely that benefit and contribution rules will conform more closely to
offerings in the private sector.
Regarding plan financing, most public pension plans today require contri-
butions from both employers and employees, and most plans are relatively
well funded, albeit with equities making up some 60 percent of the assets.
In the face of this trend, some investment experts argue that pensions are
investing too much in equities as compared to their pension liability struc-
ture. On the other hand, this investment mix is the result of public pension
plan governance structures, which are quite diverse and generally involve
politicians as well as plan members. It is interesting that virtually the same
investment asset mix has emerged in the private sector, where the pension
governance structure is based on fiduciary law embodied in the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). Part of the reason that
investment practices appear so similar is, no doubt, that public plans are
increasingly being held to the same performance standards as private invest-
ment managers. Another reason is that public sector investors have been
attracted with high market rates of return and little apparent risk over the
last twenty years. In many ways, public pension plans have benefited from
shifts in investment practices, greater competition in investment practices,
and increased transparency in reporting and disclosure that have today be-
come the norm in private pension practice.
Our review of the public pension arena at the threshold of the twenty-
first century finds a generally robust, well-funded, and reasonably well man-
aged pension environment. Notwithstanding this positive assessment, many
challenges remain for the future. The aging and more mobile workforce
will exacerbate pressures to make changes such as replacing defined bene-
fit plans with hybrid or defined contribution plans. It would also be pain-
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ful if there were a substantial and long-term economic downturn. Pension
funding ratios are quite healthy at present, but this is partly a result of
strong stock returns-which may not persist in the future. In order to spread
this risk of possible market downturn, public employers may feel the need
to move to defined contribution, or perhaps hybrid, plans that shift capi-
tal market risk to participants. Bryan (this volume) has shown how a state
budget crisis can influence public pension financing decisions; whether
state budgetary fiscal problems might translate into pension problems on a
broader scale remains to be seen. Finally, an important challenge will arise
as the nation's social security system is reformed. Broader integration and
design issues would be raised for most public - and indeed private - pen-
sion plans if the nation's "first-pillar" of old-age support were altered funda-
mentally.
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